When signals fail: navigating a world of unreliable positioning

Key takeaways

• GNSS interference is now a daily operating condition in the Gulf, the Red Sea approaches and the Baltic.
• Subtle spoofing is the most dangerous kind, because a plausible but wrong position can shape decisions before anyone notices.
• Navigation security now covers signals, systems and threats along the route, with new cyber rules from IMO, IACS and the US Coast Guard.
• Orca AI keeps tracking surrounding traffic on day and thermal cameras when GNSS can’t be trusted, and alerts the bridge, the shore and other Orca AI vessels heading into the same area.

Maritime navigation has long been built on an assumption: that satellite positioning can be trusted. That assumption is now under sustained pressure.

During Orca AI’s recent webinar, GPS Under Attack: Preparing for a World of Unreliable Navigation Signals, the discussion moved quickly from theory to operational reality.

Edwin Lampert, Executive Editor at Riviera, moderated a panel of:

• Panagiotis Anastasiou, Cyber Security Strategy Leader, Bureau Veritas
• Panos Kourkountis, Technical Director, SeaTraders SA
• Yarden Gross, CEO and Co-founder, Orca AI

The backdrop was a sharp escalation in GNSS disruption in the Gulf. In the first 8 days after the conflict began on 28 February 2026, Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 2,694 vessels affected by interference. The conversation focused on one question: how can operators keep navigating safely when the signals they rely on can’t be assumed reliable?

A threat that is already here

The panel agreed that GNSS interference is already widespread and increasing.

From a class perspective, Anastasiou pointed to a growing body of incident data and industry reporting that shows disruption is frequent and spreading geographically. Mariners report that the situation isn’t improving, and interference is now a recurring operational condition.

Gross added fleet-level visibility. Drawing on data from vessels already experiencing disruption, he said spoofing and jamming events have increased sharply in recent months and are unlikely to be temporary. They represent a new baseline of operational complexity.

For operators, the implication is clear: GNSS unreliability is a condition to manage actively, on every voyage through affected waters.

Regulation is moving, and risk is moving faster

The webinar took place shortly after an extraordinary session of the IMO Council (C/ES.36, 18–19 March 2026), which noted “extensive jamming and spoofing” in the region and called for a coordinated approach to navigation safety.

Anastasiou described the practical takeaway for operators as a shift toward multi-sensor navigation. Vessels need to combine several data sources and make sure integrity monitoring is in place.

The panel was also realistic about what regulation can do.

Recent incidents show electronic and physical threats overlapping. The container ship Source Blessing was struck by a projectile about 35nm north of Jebel Ali on 12 March 2026, on a day when JMIC recorded more than 600 GNSS disruption events in the region. Current regulatory frameworks, the panel agreed, don’t fully address that combination.

Gross put it more broadly: regulation is heading in the right direction, but risk is evolving faster. Operational playbooks and onboard decision-making carry the weight in the meantime.

What crews actually experience

One of the most practical parts of the discussion focused on what GNSS disruption looks like on the bridge:

• Obvious spoofing. The ship appears on land or moves at impossible speeds. These cases are relatively easy to spot and trigger established cross-check procedures.
• Subtle spoofing. The position shifts slightly but stays plausible. Gross said these are more dangerous, because they can influence decisions before anyone recognizes them.
• Complete signal loss. In severe cases, Kourkountis said, crews lose positioning data entirely and fall back on traditional methods, compass and sextant.

Kourkountis was candid about that last point. The tools are still on board, but many crews are no longer practiced enough to rely on them under pressure.

The result is a growing gap between fallback capability on paper and practical readiness.

From reacting to anticipating

A clear shift emerging from the discussion is the move from responding to disruption to preparing for it.

With better data and visibility, some operators now anticipate disruption. Gross described how real-time intelligence can flag high-risk areas, so vessels prepare in advance: adjusting watchkeeping, reinforcing procedures and raising situational awareness before entering affected zones.

Preparation reduces risk. As several panelists noted, disruption is far easier to manage when it’s expected, particularly in complex or high-traffic waters.

The role of shore-based support

The session also pointed to a gradual change in the relationship between ship and shore.Anastasiou stressed governance: clear roles, responsibilities and communication structures when incidents occur. With better connectivity, shore-based operations centers can monitor vessels in near real time, providing an external reference point and spotting anomalies such as sudden position “jumps”.

The result is distributed situational awareness, where ship and shore work together to validate data and support decisions.

That takes more than technology. It depends on structured procedures and a shared understanding of how to respond, and both are still uneven across the industry.

Technology is one layer of the answer

The panel discussed a range of emerging solutions:

• Authenticated navigation messages, such as Galileo OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication)
• Interference detection systems, such as JASP-R
• Alternative positioning, including Iridium-based LEO systems

Each addresses part of the problem, whether spoofing detection, signal authentication or backup positioning, and gaps remain. Resilience comes from layering: combining technologies, cross-checking inputs and keeping redundancy across systems.

Gross also pointed to AI-driven situational awareness as an additional layer, particularly for visibility and alerting that work independently of GNSS inputs.

Key themes from the session:

• GNSS disruption is now a persistent, real-world operational challenge
• Regulatory frameworks are evolving, but lag behind the pace of risk
• Subtle spoofing events pose the greatest danger, because detection comes late
• Traditional navigation methods remain important, but practical proficiency is declining
• Data-backed risk planning is becoming a differentiator
• Shore-based support is growing, and depends on clear governance and connectivity
• Resilience comes from layered systems

What does navigation security mean for ships in 2026?

Navigation security is the protection of everything a ship navigates by, and of the ship itself, along its route: satellite positioning, AIS, ECDIS and other networked bridge systems, plus awareness of physical threats in the area. It’s the focus of Orca AI’s navigation security solution, and in 2026 it has become part of routine passage planning. Where the pressure is coming from:

• The Gulf and Red Sea. In June 2026, JMIC described GNSS interference as “consistent” across the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the central Red Sea and the Suez approaches.
• The Baltic. Finland’s transport agency Traficom recorded 405 vessels reporting interference in the Gulf of Finland between January and
• September 2026. Some of the same waters see shadow fleet tankers sailing with AIS off.
• Groundings. The MSC Antonia grounded on Eliza Shoals in the Red Sea in May 2025, an incident attributed by maritime analysts to suspected GPS spoofing.
• UN agencies. ICAO, ITU and IMO issued a joint statement in March 2025 expressing “grave concern” over interference with satellite navigation.

Cyber rules now cover the systems behind the navigation picture:

What bridge teams can do now, based on the MSCIO advisory for the region:

• Treat GNSS as unreliable in known interference zones, and verify position by Radar and visual means.
• Be ready for dead reckoning and traditional position fixing before entering the area.
• Brief the watch in advance and consider an extra officer on the bridge.
• Watch for AIS anomalies, since other ships’ positions can be spoofed too.
• Keep an independent visual reference that works without GNSS.

Orca AI checks GPS against other onboard signals, alerts the bridge and the shore when spoofing is detected, and keeps tracking surrounding traffic on day and thermal cameras. Validated alerts go to other Orca AI vessels approaching the same area. We covered the bridge side in more depth in when GNSS can’t be taken for granted and spoofed, jammed, blind.

Conclusion

The webinar made one point clear: the foundations of navigation are shifting. Positioning data has to be verified before it’s trusted. Safe navigation increasingly depends on verification, redundancy and judgment, with technology supporting the officer who stays in command.

FAQs

What is navigation security at sea?

Navigation security is the protection of a ship’s navigation information and the ship itself along its route. It covers GNSS jamming and spoofing, AIS manipulation, cyber risks to bridge systems, and physical threats in the area. In 2026 it’s part of passage planning for any route through the Gulf, the Red Sea or the Baltic.

How can ships navigate safely when GNSS is unreliable?

Cross-check position with Radar ranges, visual bearings and other onboard sensors, and be ready for dead reckoning. Brief the watch before entering known interference zones. An independent visual reference, like camera-based detection, keeps surrounding traffic visible when satellite positioning can’t be trusted.

What is the difference between GPS jamming and spoofing?

Jamming overwhelms satellite signals so the receiver loses its position. Spoofing feeds the receiver false signals, so it shows a position that looks valid but is wrong. Jamming is usually obvious on the bridge. Subtle spoofing is harder to spot and more dangerous.

Where is GNSS interference most common?

In 2026, interference is concentrated in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea and Suez approaches, the Baltic, and parts of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Maritime security advisories from JMIC and MSCIO track the affected areas.

Can technology alone solve GNSS interference?

No single technology covers it yet. Authenticated signals like Galileo OSNMA, interference detection and LEO backup positioning each address part of the problem. Resilience comes from layering them, cross-checking inputs and keeping crews practiced in traditional navigation.