Redefining Human Error: How bridge under-manning undermines the value of maritime safety technology

It’s easy to point to “human error” after an incident at sea. But what if that label is masking a deeper, more uncomfortable truth?

In a recent Orca AI webinar during Singapore Maritime Week, Captain Georgios Asteros, Operations Director at Maran Tankers Management, challenged the default narrative.

“Let’s say you have a vessel with minimal bridge crew, with a lot of things in their hands at the same time, trying to communicate with shore and so on, and an accident happens,” he said. “It’s not strictly human error… it’s more about the lack of political willingness to face the work burden issue.”

Too often, systemic issues – chronic under-manning, poor rest, unrealistic operational demands – are reframed as personal failures. The result? A safety conversation that avoids the real culprit: cognitive overload in overburdened crews increasingly asked to manage not only the ship but also layers of digital systems meant to support them.

This article challenges the routine use of “human error” as a default explanation for maritime accidents, arguing that it often conceals deeper systemic issues such as chronic under-manning, fatigue and mounting cognitive overload on bridge teams. As ships become more digitally complex, there is a clear risk that seafarers are being required to manage expanding responsibilities with fewer people – a dynamic that can be made worse when technology is introduced as a substitute rather than a support. This approach not only undermines safety but can also distort the purpose of emerging technologies. Instead, the article advocates for a renewed safety culture where digital tools are used to reinforce human capacity, reduce workload and ensure crews are equipped to operate effectively.

The Hidden Crisis Behind “Human Error”

The root of many accidents isn’t carelessness – it’s fatigue. And fatigue, in this context, is not a human flaw. It’s a structural failure.

Despite formal safeguards such as the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC, 2006), real-world conditions tell a different story. A recent global study by the World Maritime University and the ITF Seafarers’ Trust revealed that 64.3% of seafarers had falsified work/rest records, often under management pressure. Shockingly, 49.1% said they were directly instructed to do so.

Meanwhile, shore leave has all but disappeared, with 70% of seafarers saying they go ashore fewer than three times per six-month contract. Combine this with poor sleep conditions, rapid port rotations and rising administrative burdens – particularly for senior officers – and the outcome is predictable: widespread exhaustion, decision fatigue and higher risk of making mistakes on the watch.

Technology alone can’t fix this. In fact, when poorly integrated or used as a substitute for proper manning, it can deepen the problem. A fatigued officer on a thinly staffed bridge isn’t helped by another alert or interface demanding his attention. Too often, digital systems are introduced with the implicit or explicit goal of reducing crew numbers, rather than supporting the existing team. As the industry edges closer to semi-autonomous and eventually fully autonomous operations, there’s a growing tendency to view technology as a replacement for people — a way to lower headcount rather than lighten workload. But while machines can assist with detection and data processing, they cannot replace human judgment, real-time adaptability, or the ability to respond intuitively in moments of crisis. When tech is implemented without corresponding investment in manning and training, it doesn’t just fail to help — it adds complexity without capacity, increasing the cognitive burden on the very individuals it was meant to support.

Redefining Seaworthiness For The Real World 

Modern seaworthiness must go beyond the vessel’s technical condition, to include the mental and physical readiness of the crew, taking into account the factors that contribute to crew fatigue.

Today’s ships operate in complex environments: managing live port communications, ECDIS updates, compliance paperwork, layered digital systems and safety oversight – often with just the legal minimum of personnel.

Minimal crewing may tick a regulatory box, but it fails the operational reality test. And when something goes wrong, it is the humans – not the spreadsheets – who carry the blame.

Is a vessel truly seaworthy if its bridge team is exhausted, overstretched and unsupported?

Technology Should lighten The Load – Not Add To It

Modern digital decision-support tools (e.g., AI situational awareness / collision avoidance systems, real-time voyage optimization and weather routing systems, performance optimization systems leveraging digital twins, etc.) are reshaping bridge operations, but they are only as good as the context they’re deployed in. Used wisely, they serve as a virtual co-pilot, enhancing awareness, flagging risks and reducing manual load. Used poorly with inadequate alarm management – or as an excuse to cut crew numbers – they can become just another source of noise, distraction or blame.

As Captain Asteros noted: “The easy answer is always human error – but if we don’t address manning and workload honestly, we’re not serious about safety.”

…And Is Not A Substitute For People

If the first casualty of bridge under-manning is crew wellbeing, the second is clarity – especially around the role of technology.

There’s a subtle but dangerous shift underway: advanced systems being introduced not to support, but to replace human presence.Captain Asteros observed that if “you imagine an autonomous ship – there are more people sitting in the remote control room than probably on the bridge of the vessel… But you don’t have the people on board to deal with issues that happen.”

Fellow panellist in Singapore, Mark O’Neil, President of Columbia Shipmanagement, was equally direct: “There’s a very big difference between reliance upon and support from. These systems must be complementary – not replacements.”

When Crew Fatigue Meets Failure

Behind the headlines of maritime accidents, a quieter pattern emerges – one that’s less about isolated errors and more about systemic overload. These recent incidents offer a sobering look at what happens when manning models ignore human limits:

1. NCL Salten grounding

Location: Byneset, Trondheim, Norway
Date: 22 May 2025

The feeder container ship NCL Salten ran aground just outside Trondheim. While the investigation is ongoing, initial reports suggest: 

•   Only one crew member was on the bridge at the time of the incident
•   That officer is believed to have fallen asleep, with no backup on watch
•   Bridge alarms, if activated, were either not heeded or not effective

The incident has triggered concern among maritime safety observers. While solo night watchkeeping remains legally permissible under minimum safe manning regulations, this case illustrates the real-world consequences of relying on a lone fatigued individual to shoulder full operational awareness –particularly in coastal waters requiring high alertness and frequent adjustments.

2. Solong / Stena Immaculate collision

Location: North Sea
Date: April 2025

In a fatal accident, the container vessel Solong collided with the anchored tanker Stena Immaculate, resulting in the death of a crew member. According to the UK MAIB’s interim investigation:

•   Neither vessel had a dedicated lookout on the bridge at the time of the incident
•   Investigators are reviewing crew fatigue and manning decisions as likely contributing factors

This case underscores how even vessels at anchor or in routine transit require visual watchkeeping, especially at night. The alleged absence of a lookout on either vessel not only violates best practice – it reveals how standard safety roles may increasingly be deprioritised under thin crewing models.

This isn’t a failure of professional competence, it signals a breakdown of basic bridge resource management.

3. Scot Carrier / Karin Høj collision

Location: Baltic Sea
Date: December 2021

This devastating collision between the UK-registered cargo vessel Scot Carrier and the Danish vessel Karin Høj resulted in the deaths of two crew members. The UK MAIB’s final report found that:

•   The officer of the watch was alone on the bridge at night
•   He was under the influence of alcohol
•   No secondary crew member was present to monitor, assist, or intervene

The MAIB issued a clear condemnation of solo night watchkeeping, stating that “It remains unacceptable that the industry continues to allow a single person to keep watch at night.”

While alcohol was a factor, the deeper systemic issue was the lack of redundancy. Had another crew member been present – as part of a dual-watch system – the opportunity to prevent or recover from the lapse may have remained. The tragedy highlights the unacceptable risks of treating lone watchkeeping as a viable default, especially on vessels navigating busy coastal corridors.

These cases vary in detail but point to a common denominator: crews asked to do too much with too little – whether through solo watchkeeping, absent lookouts or unsustainable workloads. Such incidents are not one-offs but symptoms of a cost-efficiency model that accepts exhaustion as normal.

Until the industry designs systems, schedules and manning around human capacity, and not legal regulatory minimums, we will keep reliving these failures – and calling them “human error.”

The Path Forward: Resourcing Human Expertise

If shipping is serious about safety, we need to stop treating technology as a substitute and start treating it as a support system. That means:

1. Reassessing manning and operational expectations

A ship can meet legal manning requirements and still be dangerously short-staffed in practice. The UK MCA’s MGN 520(M) identifies fatigue and workload among the top 12 contributing factors in accidents. It’s time for adaptive manning models that match real operational complexity – not just compliance thresholds.

2. Using technology to support, not replace, the crew

Decision-support systems, predictive analytics and shore-based monitoring can help – but only when they reduce pressure, not shift it. Augmentation, not automation per se, should be the guiding principle.

3. Redefining seaworthiness

It’s not enough for a ship to be technically sound. It must also be human-ready: adequately crewed, realistically supported and resilient under real-world demands.

Where ORCA Fits In

At Orca AI, we believe safety technology must serve the people who operate it. Our platform – featuring the SeaPod automated watchkeeper and FleetView application for shore offices – is designed to: 

•   Reduce bridge workload through intelligent automation
•   Enhance situational awareness with predictive detection
•   Offer real-time shore support without overwhelming onboard teams
•   Help owners identify and address fatigue-related operational risk

Because when over 80% of maritime casualties involve the human element, the answer isn’t fewer humans. It’s better support for the ones already stretched thin.

Address The Root Cause

In summary, what is so often labelled “human error” is more accurately the visible symptom of a deeper problem: systemic under-resourcing and growing crew fatigue, compounded in some cases by an emerging over-reliance on technology as a substitute rather than a support. Recent incidents – including the NCL Salten grounding, the Solong/Stena Immaculate collision and the fatal Scot Carrier/Karin Høj crash – highlight how solo watchkeeping, absent lookouts and thin manning models can consistently erode the margin for safe operations. The maritime industry must move beyond the flawed assumption that smarter systems alone can compensate for fewer people, and instead embrace solutions that both enhance human vigilance and respect human limits. That’s where tools like Orca AI come in – not to replace the people at the heart of ship operations but to help them stay alert, make safer decisions and manage their workload more effectively.

True maritime safety demands both human  and digital support, not one in place of the other. So the question remains: Will the industry continue to accept the illusion of safety – or will it finally confront the reality that safe ships require sufficiently manned, well-supported crews — alert, equipped and present in the right numbers to protect themselves, vessel assets and valuable cargo?